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Independent Orbiter Assessment
FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the Orbiter and GFE Projects
office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL.
The IOA analysis features a top-down approach to determine
hardware failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, the analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA and
prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation. The assessment process
compares the independently derived failure modes and criticality
assignments to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL
documentation. When possible, assessment issues are discussed
and resolved with the NASA subsystem managers. Unresolved issues
are elevated to the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office manager,
Configuration Control Board (CCB), or Program Requirements
Control Board (PRCB) for further resolution. An issue generally
refers to a disagreement between the NASA FMEA/CIL and the IOA
failure mode analysis results. This process was reviewed twice
by the National Research Council, Shuttle Criticality Review and
Hazard Analysis Audit Committee, and was concluded to be
acceptable.
As a result of the programmatic requirement to end the IOA task
in March 1988, the FMEA/CIL baseline under review was "frozen" as
of 1 January 1988. This date allowed for the majority of
subsystems to be assessed based upon the proposed post 51-L NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation presented to either the CCB or PRCB.
However, for those subsystems where the NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL
reviews were still in progress, the assessment used unofficial
FMEA/CIL data provided by the subsystem managers or whatever
documentation that was available as of 1 January 1988.
The assessment results for each subsystem have been documented in
separate assessment reports (Section 6.0 References), and
summaries are provided in Appendix C. Table i-i presents an
overview of the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation assessed, the IOA
recommended baseline, and unresolved issues, and Table 1-2
presents the status of CIL issues. A total of 3,193 total FMEA
issues and 1,586 CIL issues remain to be resolved. Many issues
are, however, "paper" issues attributed to the lack of updated
FMEA/CIL documentation, or arise because of the lack of adequate
time to pursue resolution with the subsystem managers (a time
consuming process). Due to these reasons, the actual FMEA/CIL
documentation should be in far better shape than these numbers
suggest.
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Some of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL assessment issues are attributed to
differences in interpreting NSTS 22206 ground rules and
instructions. For example, Rockwell occasionally used a very
broad redundancy interpretation approach which caused more IR and
2R functional criticalities than IOA. It appears that the
definition of redundancies was expanded to include unrelated
multiple failures. IOA on the other hand, limited redundancy to
failure items under study, which resulted in less severe
functional criticalities.
The most important Orbiter assessment finding was the previously
unknown "stuck" autopilot push-button criticality i/i failure
mode, having a worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle when a
microwave landing system is not active. Rockwell has been
directed by the CCB to add the failure mode to the FMEA/CIL
documentation and to implement a software change to bypass a
stuck "Auto" switch.
SPAR Aerospace conducted their Remote Manipulator System (RMS)
failure mode analysis in a manner similar to IOA and consistent
with NSTS 22206. One major issue remains open affecting sixty-
nine FMEA/CIL items. The issue concerns uncommanded motion of
the arm while the arm is within two feet of the Orbiter, payload,
or a suited crewman. Arm malfunction detection software cannot
guarantee that the arm will be stopped in time to prevent impact
when within the two feet envelope. To be technically correct and
totally in agreement with NSTS 2_20_, IOA recommends that
uncommanded motion failure modes be assigned a worst case effect
criticality of i/i. Currently, the criticality assignments are
2/IR.
The Extra Vehicular Maneuvering Unit (EMU) FMEA/CIL documentation
prepared by Hamilton Standard followed NSTS 22206 ground rules
and was in general agreement with IOA. Assessment of the Manned
Maneuvering Unit (MMU) was to an old FMEA/CIL baseline due to
NASA rescheduling their review to a later date.
In summary, the resolution of the remaining CIL issues is being
pursued to finalize and resolve those with possible safety
implications.
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TABLE 1-1
FMEA/ClL ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW (INTERIM)
SUBSYSTEM
FMEA CIL
IOA NASA ISSU E IOA NASA ISSU E
Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP) 50 50 0 24 24 0
Hydraulic Actuators (HA) 112 112 0 59 59 0
;Displays and Control (D&C) 171 264 45 21 21 0
Guidance, Navigation & Control (GN&C) 175 148 56 36 36 0
Orbiter Experiments (OEX) 81 191 24 1 1 0
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) 314 313 2 106 106 0
I
Backup Flight System (BFS) 33 0 0 25 22 0
Electrical Power, Distribution & Control 435 435 0 158 158 0
(EPD&C)
Landing & Deceleration (L&D) 246 260 86 124 120 51
Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D) 62 46 2 15 8 3
Pyrotechnics (PYRO) 41 37 4 41 37 4
Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) and Life 1068 708 402 318 210 141
Support System (LSS)
Crew Equipment (CE) 422 351 123 80 82 4
ii
Instrumentation (INST) 107 96 25 22 18 5
Data Processing System (DPS} 78 78 4 23 25 2
i
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control 273 262 124 73 87 48
System (ARPCS)
I
Hydraulics & Water Spray Boiler (HYD & WSB) 447 364 68 183 111 23
Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) 713 510 472 512 252 310
Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) 204 179 121 95 110 92
Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) 68 58 14 41 34 9
Remote Manipulator System (RMS) 821 585 80 448 390 74
Atmospheric Revitalization System (ARS) 223 311 102 84 113 36
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) 688 614 113 547 474 40
Power Reactant Supply & Distri bution System 382 278 27 79 89 9
(PRS&D)
Main Propulsion System (MPS) 1365 1264 399 711 749 191
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) 285 243 117 140 117 60
Reaction Control System (RCS) 763 623 376 249 206 241
Comm and Tracking (C&T) 1108 697 407 298 239 294
Total asof 1 January 1988 10735 9077 3193 4513 3898 1637
TABLE 1-2
CIL ISSUE STATUS (INTERIM)
SUBSYSTEM
Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP)
Hydraulic Actuators (HA)
Displays and Control (D&C)
Guidance, Navigation & Control (GN&C)
Orbiter Experiments (OEX)
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
Backup Flight System (BFS)
Electrical Power, Distribution & Control (EPD&C)
Landing & Deceleration (L&D)
Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D)
Pyrotechnics (PYRO)
Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) and Life
Support System (LSS)
Crew Equipment (CE)
Instrumentation (INST)
Data Processing System (DPS)
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control
System (ARPES)
Hydraulics & Water Spray Boiler (HYD & WSB)
Mechanical Actuation System (MAS)
Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
Nose Wheel Steering (NWS)
Remote Manipulator System (RMS)
Atmospheric Revitalization System (ARS)
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
Power Reactant Supply & Distribution System
(PRS&D)
Main Propulsion System (MPS)
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
Reaction Control System (RCS)
Comm and Tracking (C&T)
Totals
IOA CIL
Issues
1
17
0
0
1
25
12
Accepted
By
NASA
1
2
0
0
0
4
12
0 0
51
3
4
141
4
2
48
23
310
92
9
74
36
4O
9
Withdrawn
By
MDAC
0
15
0
0
1
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
Remaining
Open
0
0
0
0
0
51
3
4
141
5
2
48
23
310
92
9
74
36
40
9
191 0 0 191
60 0 0
0
0
241
21
294
1693 37
60
241
294
1637
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted NASA to readdress safety
policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National
Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. MDAC is providing an independent assessment of
the proposed post 51-L orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
The MDAC was initially tasked in June 1986 to conduct an
independent analysis and assessment on twenty subsystems.
Subsequently, in April 1987 the additional eight subsystems were
also added which provided complete coverage of all the Orbiter
subsystems. Table 2-1 provides a listing of the Orbiter and GFE
subsystems identified by NASA to the National Research Council,
Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee.
The IOA analysis approach is summarized in the following steps
1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA
and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and assumptions
Step 2.0 Define Subsystem Analysis Diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure Events Definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA Analysis Data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
As a result of the preceding steps, general project assumptions
and ground rules (Appendix B) were developed to amplify and
clarify instructions in NSTS 22206. Also, subsystem specific
assumptions and ground rules were defined as appropriate for the
subsystems. These assumptions and ground rules are presented in
each individual subsystem report.
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Table 2-1
ORBITER and GFE SUBSYSTEMS
ORIGINAL TWENTY SUBSYSTEMS (JUNE 1986)
o Guidance, Navigation & Control
o Data Processing System (DPS)
o Backup Flight System (BFS)
o Nose Wheel Steering (NWS)
o Instrumentation (INST)
o Electrical Power, Distribution & Control (EPD&C)
o Main Propulsion System (MPS)
o Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP)
o Power Reactant Supply & Distribution System (PRS&D)
o Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
o Reaction Control System (RCS)
o Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
o Hydraulics & Water Spray Boiler (HYD & WSB)
o Atmospheric Revitalization System (ARS)
o Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
(ARPCS)
o Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
o Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
o Landing & Deceleration (L&D)
o Hydraulic Actuators (HA)
o Remote Manipulator System (RMS)
ADDITIONAL EIGHT SUBSYSTEMS (APRIL 1987)
o Communication and Tracking (C&T)
o Displays and Control (D&C)
o Orbiter Experiments (OEX)
o Pyrotechnics (PYRO)
o Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D)
o Mechanical Actuation System (MAS)
o Active Thermal Control System (ATCS), Life Support
System (LSS), and Airlock Support System (ALSS)
o Crew Equipment (CE)
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3 •0 RESULTS
The IOA task was accomplished in three phases; namely a review of
both the NSTS 22206 and RI 100-2G FMEA/CIL Desk Instructions,
an independent subsystem failure modes analysis, and an
independent assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
documentation. The NSTS 22206 and RI _00-2G documents were first
reviewed and evaluated to determine if any omissions and
ambiguities existed that impeded the preparation process or
prevented the surfacing of major technical issues. This task was
completed and a report was published in October 1986 (Reference
I). Many of the recommendations have been incorporated in
subsequent versions of NSTS 22206.
The independent failure mode analysis process used available
subsystem drawings and schematics, documentation, and procedures.
Each of the twenty-eight subsystems was broken down into lower
level assemblies and individual hardware components using block
diagrams. Each component was then evaluated and analyzed for
credible failure modes and effects. Criticalities were assigned
based on the worst possible effect of each failure mode
consistent with the NSTS 22206. And to preserve independence,
the analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The
independent analysis of the twenty-eight subsystems was completed
and published in separate analysis reports (see Section 6.0
References).
The final phase of the IOA task was to provide an independent
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL
results for completeness and technical accuracy. This process
compared the independently derived analysis results to the
proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL, and investigated any
significant discrepancies.
The IOA assessment process resulted in a total of 10,735 FMEAs and
4,482 potential critical items, which resulted in a total of
3,193 FMEA issues and 1,586 CIL issues after being compared with
the proposed NASA FMEA/CIL data. An issue generally refers to a
disagreement between the IOA and NASA FMEA/CIL results. The
assessment results were fully documented in separate assessment
reports (Section 6.0 References), and some of the major issues
are briefly discussed in Appendix C for each subsystem. Appendix
D provides a comparison of IOA recommended CIL items and Rockwell
CIL packages.
The most significant Orbiter assessment issue was uncovered by
the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) subsystem assessment team. The
failure mode was a "stuck" autopilot push-button causing the
worst case effect of loss of crew/vehicle (criticality I/i). The
Orbiter autopilot is used for entry, and manually disengaged
before landing. The autopilot is engaged by "Roll/Yaw Auto" and
"Pitch Auto" push-button indicators (PBIs). If either "Auto" PBI
fails closed, the autopilot cannot be permanently disengaged.
With the autopilot remaining engaged, the Orbiter will attempt to
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"Autoland", which requires a Microwave Landing System (MLS) on
the ground. MLS is not required for day landings, and has not
been "available" for four of the last seven STS missions.
Without the MLS, use of the autoland alone will cause the Orbiter
to miss the runway. A single point failure with no redundancy
and which threatens loss of crew/vehicle is categorized by NSTS
22206 as a "criticality I" item. Rockwell is adding the failure
mode to the FMEA/CIL baseline and developing a software change to
bypass a failed "Auto" switch.
SPAR Aerospace prepared their RMS FMEAs in a manner similar to
IOA and consistent with NSTS 22206. The only major difference
is one issue which could not be resolved with the subsystem
manager. This issue is the use of software routines as unlike
redundancy to downgrade the criticalities on FMEAs. The failure
mode was uncommanded arm motion. The failure effect is RMS arm
impact with the Orbiter, payload, or suited astronauts. Standard
arm operation such as berthing/unberthing, grappling, payload
deployment and retrieval, requires the arm to approach the
Orbiter or payload closer than two feet. Any malfunction
resulting in uncommanded motion while the arm is within this two
foot envelope presents the possibility of impact with the
Orbiter. Arm malfunction detection software routines or operator
action cannot guarantee that the arm can be stopped in time to
prevent impact. The software design specification is to stop the
arm within a stopping distance of two feet. Consequently, the
IOA recommendation is that the sixty-nine uncommanded arm motion
failure modes be upgraded from criticality 2/IR to i/i. This
issue has gone before the CCB, but has not been presented to the
PRCB.
4.0 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
The number of open issues associated with the subsystem FMEA/CIL
assessment is identified and presented in Table I-i. Some of
these issues may be attributed to the lack of updated FMEA/CIL
data not being received by 1 January 1988 in order to adequately
assess the assigned criticalities. Further, due to the
programmatic requirement to end the IOA task in the March 1988
timeframe, adequate time was not always available to resolve
credible issues with the subsystem manager (a time consuming
process). Consequently, these issues remain for later
resolution. All issues are fully discussed for each subsystem in
separate assessment reports. The following paragraphs briefly
discuss some of the difficulties and observations encountered
during the IOA study period:
A. Late and Incomplete FMEA/CIL Documentation - Due to some
NASA/RI FMEA/CIL reviews extending past 1 January 1988, IOA
was not always able to assess the most current FMEA/CIL
baseline and consequently did not resolve the relevant issues
with subsystem managers. For example, the Main Propulsion
System (MPS) and Communication and Tracking Subsystems are
still in the review process as of 9 March 1988. Many other
subsystems have only updated the CILs, and FMEAs that are not
CIL items are to be updated at a later date, e.g., Atmospheric
Revitalization Subsystem and Display and Control Subsystem.
So Ground Rules Interpretation - As a result of ambiguous
language used in NSTS 22206, many disagreements were noted
analyzing hardware failure modes. Some of the major sources
of confusion are discussed briefly below for like and unlike
redundancies, redundancy screens, emergency systems, and crew
action and its impact on deriving criticalities.
ao Like and Unlike Redundancy - The interpretation of like
and unlike redundant items and definition of a hardware
item function are not clearly defined; however, their
impact in assigning functional criticality is significant.
A broad interpretation creates more IR and 2R functional
criticalities. And most importantly, the discussion of
parallel functional paths is not adequate to clarify
redundancies. Two examples are discussed belowL
Example 1 - One of the single most important difficulties
encountered during the assessment of the NASA/Rockwell
data was the utilization of multiple scenarios in
assigning functional criticalities. In such cases, the
Rockwell approach seemed to investigate the redundancies
to the effect of the failure of the item under study
instead of redundancies to the item. For example,
failure of the fill and drain Quick Disconnect (QD) and
the drain cap on the supply water system was tied to the
failure of the radiators and ammonia boiler systems in
the active thermal control system. This was apparently
done since loss of the flash evaporator system was seen
as an effect of the failure under study which would
therefore be a redundant leg to the radiators and ammonia
boiler systems. In these cases, the functional
criticalities were assigned for potential loss of
life/vehicle. IOA interpretation is to make the QD and
the drain cap redundant to each other and then investigate
the functional loss (flash evaporator system) arising from
loss of these redundancies. In this manner, only a
potential for worst case loss of mission was anticipated
by IOA instead of loss of crew/vehicle.
Example 2 - In certain cases, the Rockwell analysis used
failure of another item to be the cause for the failure
of the item under study. This approach assumes a failure
is already in progress which is contrary to the hardware
criticality requirements stated in the NSTS 22206. Under
the hardware criticality requirements only singular
direct effect of the identified failure mode of a
hardware item is to be investigated.
b.
Co
d.
Redundancy Screens - Language such as "...capable of check
out..." for Screen A, and "...from a single credible
event..." for Screen C are left for a lot of conjecture on
the part of an analyst. Further, the objectives for
complying with the screens are not sufficiently defined
in order to adequately cover them.
Emergency Systems - The definition of the emergency
systems excludes hardware items which are used during
nominal mission phases and any intact abort cases.
For example, the Launch Entry Helmet oxygen supply panel
and the Airlock Support System were assigned emergency
status by the subsystem managers. This created a very
conservative approach open to personal feelings and not
consistent with the NSTS 22206.
Crew Action - Crew action in response to a failure is not
clear when assigning hardware criticality as opposed to
functional criticality. Also, off-nominal versus nominal
versus contingency crew actions are used interchangeably
throughout the NSTS 22206 creating confusion.
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5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the assessment results and independent study of the
twenty-eight subsystems, the following recommendations are drawn:
A. Consideration should be given to resolving all of the issues
identified by IOA to ensure that no item remains with
possible safety implications.
So The unassociated multiple failure scenarios and failures
already in progress as used by Rockwell should be evaluated,
since they create a very broad and conservative methodology
to the FMEA/CIL process. This approach may reduce visibility
into failure modes and effects for some particular items,
since the majority of the functional criticality 2s and 3s
are replaced by iRs and 2Rs respectively.
Co Consideration should be given in improving NSTS 22206 to
eliminate sources of ambiguities. The document should be
rearranged to provide step-by-step procedures and
instructions for conducting hardware analysis. This would
reduce guess work and eliminate differences in philosophy
used from one subsystem to another. More specifically, the
related topics with redundancies (criticality, screens,
like/unlike...etc) should be further expanded to ensure
consistent application of methodology and criticality
assignments.
n. Adequate coordination and interface should be established
between analysis subsystems to eliminate duplication of
effort in interfacing subsystems, and to ensure complete
coverage of all hardware items.
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ACRONYMS
ABS
ACA
ACIP
ADI
ADP
ADS
ADTA
ALCA
AMCA
AOA
AOS
APC
APU
ARCS
ARPCS
ARS
ASA
ATCS
ATO
ATVC
B&AS
BF
BFC
BFS
BITE
C&W
CCB
CCC
CCTV
CCU
CIL
CIU
CNTLR
COAS
COMM
CPU
CRIT
CWS
D&C
DAP
DCM
DCN
DDU
DEU
DFI
DHE
DMA
DOD
DPS
DSC
- Ammonia Boiler System
- Annunciator Control Assembly
- Aerodynamic Coefficient Instrumentation Package
- Attitude Direction Indicator
- Air Data Probe
- Audio Distribution System
- Air Data Transducer Assembly
- Aft Load Control Assembly
- Aft Motor Control Assembly
- Abort-Once-Around
- Acquisition of Signal
- Aft Power Controller
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aft Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
- Atmospheric Revitalization System
- Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
- Active Thermal Control Subsystem
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Ascent Thrust Vector Control
- Brakes and Antiskid
- Body Flap
- Backup Flight Control
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Caution and Warning
- Change Control Board
- Contaminant Control Cartridge
- Closed-Circuit Television
- Crew Communications Umbilical
- Critical Items List
- Communications Interface Unit
- Controller
- Crew Optical Alignment Sight
- Communication
- Central Processing Unit
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning System
- Displays and Controls
- Digital Autopilot
- Display and Control Module
- Document Change Notice
- Display Driver Unit
- Display Electronic Unit
- Development Flight Instrumentation
- Data-Handling Electronics
- Deployed Mechanical Assembly
- Department of Defense
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Dedicated Signal Conditioner
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ACRONYMS
ABS
ACA
ACIP
ADI
ADP
ADS
ADTA
ALCA
AMCA
AOA
AOS
APC
APU
ARCS
ARPCS
ARS
ASA
ATCS
ATO
ATVC
B&AS
BF
BFC
BFS
BITE
C&W
CCB
CCC
CCTV
CCU
CIL
CIU
CNTLR
COAS
COMM
CPU
CRIT
CWS
D&C
DAP
DCM
DCN
DDU
DEU
DFI
DHE
DMA
DOD
DPS
DSC
- Ammonia Boiler System
- Annunciator Control Assembly
- Aerodynamic Coefficient Instrumentation Package
- Attitude Direction Indicator
- Air Data Probe
- Audio Distribution System
- Air Data Transducer Assembly
- Aft Load Control Assembly
- Aft Motor Control Assembly
- Abort-Once-Around
- Acquisition of Signal
- Aft Power Controller
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aft Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
- Atmospheric Revitalization System
- Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
- Active Thermal Control Subsystem
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Ascent Thrust Vector Control
- Brakes and Antiskid
- Body Flap
- Backup Flight Control
- Backup Flight System
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Caution and Warning
- Change Control Board
- Contaminant Control Cartridge
- Closed-Circuit Television
- Crew Communications Umbilical
- Critical Items List
- Communications Interface Unit
- Controller
- Crew Optical Alignment Sight
- Communication
- Central Processing Unit
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning System
- Displays and Controls
- Digital Autopilot
- Display and Control Module
- Document Change Notice
- Display Driver Unit
- Display Electronic Unit
- Development Flight Instrumentation
- Data-Handling Electronics
- Deployed Mechanical Assembly
- Department of Defense
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Dedicated Signal Conditioner
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ECLSS
EI
EIU
EMU
EPA
EPDC
EPG
EPS
ET
EVA
EVCS
FC
FCA
FCL
FCOS
FCP
FCS
FDA
FDM
FES
FFSSO
FLCA
FM
FMCA
FMD
FMEA
FPC
FRCS
FSM
FSS
FSSR
FSW
GAS
GFE
GMT
GNC
GPC
GSE
GSTDN
HDC
HEX
HIRAP
HIU
HPFTP
HPOT
HUT
HW
HX
HYD
ACRONYMS
- Environmental Control and Life Support System (Subsystem)
- Entry Interface
- Engine Interface Unit
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Environmental Protection Agency
- Electrical Power, Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power Generator
- Electrical Power System
- External Tank
- Extravehicular Activity
- Extravehicular Communications System
- Fuel Cell
- Flow Control Assembly
- Freon Coolant Loop
- Flight Control Operating System
- Fuel Cell Power (Plant)
- Flight Control System
- Fault Detection and Annunciation
- Frequency Division Multiplexing
- Flash Evaporator System
- Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX
- Forward Load Control Assembly
- Failure Mode
- Forward Motor Control Assembly
- Frequency Division Multiplexer
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Forward Power Controller
- Forward Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Fault Summary Message
- Flight Support Structure
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Flight Software
- Get-Away Special
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Greenwich Mean Time
- Guidance, Navigation, and Control
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Ground Spaceflight Tracking and Data Netowrk
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Heat Exchanger
- High-Resolution Accelerometer Package
- Headset Interface Unit
- High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
- High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
- Hard Upper Torso
- Hardware
- Heat Exchanger
- Hydraulics
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ICM
ICMS
ICOM
ICRS
IFM
IMU
IOA
IOM
IUS
IVA
JSC
KBD
LCA
LCC
LCVG
LEH
- Interface Control Module
- Intercom Master Station
- Intercommunications
- Intercom Remote Station
- In-Flight Maintenance
- Inertial Measurement Unit
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Input/Output Module
- Inertial Upper Stage
- Intravehicular Activity
- Johnson Space Center
- Ku-Band Deploy
- Load Controller Assembly
- Launch Control Center
- Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment
- Launch/Entry Helmet
LNDG/DECEL - Landing and Deceleration
LPS - Launch Processing System
LRU
LSS
LTA
MADS
MAS
MCA
MCC
MCDS
MDAC
MDM
MEC
MECO
MET
MGSSA
MIA
MLG
MM
MMU
MMU
MPL
MPM
MPS
MS
MS BLS
MSK
MTU
MUX
NASA
NGSSA
NGTD
NLG
NSI
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Life Support Subsystem
- Lower Torso Assembly
- Modular Auxiliary Data System
- Mechanical Actuation System
- Motor Control Assembly
- Mission Control Center (JSC)
- Multifunction CRT Display System
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Controller
- Main Engine Cutoff
- Mission Elapsed Time
- Main Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Multiplexer Interface Adapter
- Main Landing Gear
- Major Mode
- Manned Maneuvering Unit
- Mass Memory Unit
- Minimum Power Level (65%)
- Manipulator Positioning Mechanism
- Main Propulsion System (Subsystem)
- Mission Specialist
- Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
- Manual Select Keyboard
- Master Timing Unit
- Multiplex
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Nose Landing Gear Shock Strut Assembly
- Nose Gear Touch Down
- Nose Landing Gear
- NASA Standard Initiator
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NSP
NSTS
NWS
OBS
OEX
OI
OMRSD
OMS
OTB
OWDA
P/L
PASS
PSI
PBM
PCA
PCI
PCM
PCMMU
PCN
PCS
PDU
PFR
PHS
PI
PIC
PLB
PLBD
PLS
PLSS
PMS
PRCB
PRCBD
PRCS
PRD
PROM
PRSD
PRSDS
PSA
PSA
PSP
PTT
PV&D
QD
R/SPA
RAM
RCS
RFCA
RFI
RGA
- Network Signal Processor
- National Space Transportation System
- Nose-Wheel Steering
- Operational Bioinstrumentation System
- Orbiter Experiments
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Maintenance Requirements &
Specifications Document
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Orbiter Timing Buffer
- Operational Water Dispenser Assembly
- Payload
- Primary Avionics Software System
- Push-Button Indicator
- Payload Bay Mechanical
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulation
- Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
- Page Change Notice
- Pressure Control System
- Power Drive Unit
- Portable Foot Restraint
- Personal Hygene Station
- Payload Interrogater
- Pyro Initiator Controller
- Payload Bay
- Payload Bay Door
- Primary Landing Site
- Portable Life Support Subsystem
- Propellant Management Subsystem
- Program Requirements Control Board
- Program Requirements Control Board Directive
- Primary Reaction Control System (jet)
- Payload Retention Device
- Programmable Read-Only Memory
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
- Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
- Power Section Assembly
- Provision Stowage Assembly
- Payload Signal Processor
- Push-to-talk
- Purge Vent & Drain
- Quick Disconnect
- Rudder/Pedal Brake Assembly
- Random Access Memory
- Reaction Control System
- Radiator and Flow Control Assembly
- Radio Frequency Interference
- Rate Gyro Assembly
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RHC
RHS
RI
RJD
RM
RMS
RPA
RPC
RPTA
RSB
RTD
RTLS
RTS
RVDT
S BTC
SCB
SCM
SCU
SCU
SDM
SEADS
SFOM
SFP
SGLS
SILTS
SM
SMM
SOP
SOS
SPA
SPFA
SPI
SRB
SSA
SSME
SSMEC
SSO
SSSH
ST
STDN
STS
TACAN
TAL
TCS
TD
TDRS
THC
THC
TPS
TVC
- Rotation Hand Controller
- Rehydration Station
- Rockwell International
- Reaction Jet Driver
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Manipulator System
- Ruder Pedal Assembly
- Remote Power Controller
- Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
- Rudder Speed Brake
- Resistance Temperature Device
- Return-to-Launch Site
- Remote Tracking Station
- Rotary Variable Differential Transformer
- Speed Brake Translation Controller
- Steering Control Box
- System Control Module
- Sequence Control Unit
- Service and Cooling Umbilical
- Startracker Door Mechanism
- Shuttle Entry Air Data System
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Single Failure Point
- Space Ground Link System
- Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensor
- Systems Management
- Solar Maximum Mission
- Secondary Oxygen Pack
- Space Operations Simulator
- Steering Position Amplifier
- Single Point Failure Analysis
- Surface Position Indicator
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Suit Assembly
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- SSME Controller
- Space Shuttle Orbiter
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Star Tracker
- Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
- Space Transportation System
- Tactical Air Navigation
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thermal Control System (Subsystem)
- Touch Down
- Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
- Thruster Hand Controller
- Translation Hand Controller
- Thermal Protection System
- Thrust Vector Control
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UCD
UEA
UHF
VDM
VRCS
WBSC
WCCS
WCCU
WMS
WP
WRS
WSB
ACRONYMS
- Urine Collection Device
- Unitized Electrode Assembly
- Ultra High Frequency
- Vent Door Mechanism
- Vernier Reaction Control System (jet)
- Wide-Band Signal Conditioner
- Window Cavity Conditioning System
- Wireless Crew Communications Umbilical
- Waste Management System
- Working Paper
- Water Removal Subsystem
- Water Spray Boiler
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OpS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
M__CC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
io
,
3.
4 .
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail•
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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SUBSYSTEM ASSESSMENT SUMMARIES
Section
C.l
C.2
C.3
C.4
C.5
C.6
C.7
C.8
C.9
C.10
C.ll
C.12
C.13
C.14
C.15
C.16
C.17
C. 18
C.19
C.20
C.21
C.22
C.23
C.24
C.25
C.26
C.27
C.28
Subsystem Asssessment Overview
Fuel Cell Powerplant
Hydraulic Actuators
Displays and Control
Guidance, Navigation and Control
Orbiter Experiments
Auxiliary Power Unit
Backup Flight System
Electrical Power,Distribution &
Control
Landing and Deceleration
Purge, Vent and Drain
Pyrotechnics
Active Thermal Control System and
Life Support System
Crew Equipment
Instrumentation
Data Processing System
Atmosphere Revitalization Pressure
Control System
Hydraulics and Water Spray Boiler
Mechanical Activation System
Manned Maneuvering Unit
Nose Wheel Steering
Remote Manipulator System
Atmospheric Revitalization System
Extravehicular Mobility Unit
Power Reactant Supply and
Distribution System
Main Propulsion System
Orbital Maneuvering System
Reaction Control System
Comm and Tracking
C-2
C-2
C-10
C-lO
C-10
C-15
C-15
C-18
C-18
C-20
C-24
C-24
C-29
C-32
C-32
C-32
C-37
C-37
C-40
C-40
C-42
C-45
C-48
C-50
C-53
C-53
C-57
C-60
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SUBSYSTEM ASSESSMENT SUMMARIES
The IOA assessments proved a valuable method of ensuring the
proper criticality level be assigned to each FMEA/CIL identified.
In many cases the assigned criticality level was changed by the
appropriate subsystem manager due to the IOA assessment. As a
minimum, this assessment created a deeper awareness of the
criticality level assigned and better rationale and understanding.
Differences in interpretation and level of detail caused
many of the issues generated, along with the lack of update
NASA FMEA/CIL packages. Many issues remain which should be
resolved by the Subsystem Managers.
C.l Fuel Cell Powerplant
The IOA analysis of the EPG/FCP hardware initially generated 62
failure mode worksheets and identified 32 PCIs before starting
the assessment process (See Fig. C.l). In order to facilitate
comparison, 5 additional failure mode analysis worksheets were
generated. These analysis results were compared to the proposed
NASA Post 51-L baseline (22 May 1986) of 46 FMEAs and 22 CIL
items and to the updated (22 December 1987) version of 43 FMEAs
and 23 CILs. The discrepancy between the number of NASA FMEAs
can be explained by the different approach used by NASA and IOA
to group failure modes. Upon completion of the assessment, and
after a discussion with the NASA Subsystem Manager, an agreement
between the NASA FMEAs and IOA failure modes was reached. Seven
(7) failure modes generated by the IOA analysis were added to
the FMEAs; one being a criticality 2/IR CIL item.
C.2 Body Flap/Rudder Speedbrake/Elevon/ME ATVC/Actuations
C.2.1 Body Flap Actuator
The overview in Fig. C.2a is a summary of the Body Flap actuator
assessment and presents a comparison of the Pre 51-L baseline
and the proposed Post 51-L baseline, with the IOA recommended
failures, and any issues. The main reason for differences was
that NASA combined failures, whereas IOA prepared separate
failure work-sheets. Minor differences such as fail or pass of
screens were readily resolved. As the result of discussions with
the Subsystem Manager and review of the updated FMEA/CIL, all
initial issues were resolved and changes were made to the
FMEA/CIL and IOA work-sheets. The overview further shows the
comparison of failures of the major elements of the Body Flap
actuators.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Body Flap (BF)
hardware, generating draft failure modes and PCIs. To preserve
independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon
the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation.
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Figure C.l - EPG/FCP FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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Figure C.2a - BF ACTUATOR ASSESSMENT
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The IOA analysis of the BF hardware initially generated 36 failure
mode worksheets and identified 19 PCIs before starting the assess-
ment process. In order to facilitate comparison, 7 additional
failure mode analysis worksheets were generated.
The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline
with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional
analysis as required. Upon completion of the assessment, all of
the IOA and NASA failure modes were in agreement.
C.2.2 Rudder/Speedbrake Actuator
The overview in Fig. C.2b is a summary of the RSB actuator
assessment and presents a comparison of the Pre 51-L baseline
and the proposed Post 51-L baseline, with the IOA recommended
failures, and any issues. The main reason for differences was
that NASA combined failures, whereas IOA prepared separate
failure worksheets. Minor differences such as fail or pass of
screens were readily resolved. As the result of discussions with
the Subsystem Manager and review of the updated FMEA/CIL, all
initial issues were resolved and changes were made to the
FMEA/CIL and IOA worksheets. The overview further shows the
comparison of failures of the major elements of the RSB
actuators.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Rudder/Speed
Brake (RSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and PCIs.
To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without
reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL
documentation.
The IOA analysis of the RSB hardware initially generated 38
failure mode worksheets and identified 27 PCIs before starting
the assessment process. No additional failure mode worksheets
were generated during the comparison. The IOA results were
then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline along with the
proposed Post 51-L CIL updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional
analysis as required. Upon completion of the assessment, all
of the IOA and NASA failure modes were in agreement.
C.2.3 Elevon Actuator
The overview in Fig. C.2c is a summary of the elevon actuator
assessment and presents a comparison of the Pre 51-L baseline and
the proposed Post 51-L baseline, with the IOA recommended
failures, and any issues. The main reason for differences was
that NASA combined failures, whereas IOA prepared separate
failure worksheets. Minor differences such as fail or pass of
screens were readily resolved. As the result of discussions with
the Subsystem Manager and review of the updated FMEA/CIL all
initial issues were resolved and changes were made to the
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FMEA/CIL and IOA worksheets. The overview further shows the
comparison of failures of the major elements of the elevon
actuators.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Elevon Subsystem
hardware, generating draft failure modes, and PCIs. To preserve
independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon
the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The
IOA analysis of the elevon actuator hardware initially generated 25
failure modes worksheets and identified 17 PCIs before starting the
assessment process. No additional failure mode worksheets were
generated during the comparison. The analysis results were
compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 23 FMEAs and 13
CIL items. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison
was provided through additional analysis as required. Upon
completion of the assessment, all of the IOA and NASA failure modes
were in agreement.
C.2.4 Main Engine (ATVC) Actuator
The overview in Fig. C.2d is a summary of the main engine
actuator assessment and presents a comparison of the Pre 51-L
baseline and the proposed Post 51-L baseline, with the IOA
recommended failures, and any issues. The main reason for
differences was that NASA combined failures, whereas IOA prepared
separate failures, whereas IOA prepared separate failure
worksheets. Minor differences such as fail or pass of screens
were readily resolved. As the result of discussions with the
subsystem manager and review of the up-dated FMEA/CIL all initial
issues were resolved and changes were made to the FMEA/CIL and
IOA worksheets. The overview further shows the comparison of
failures of the major elements of the elevon actuators.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Ascent Thrust
Vector Control Actuator (ATVC) hardware, generating draft failure
modes, and PCIs. To preserve independence, this analysis was
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation.
The IOA analysis of the ATVC actuator hardware initially generated
25 failure modes worksheets and identified 16 PCIs before starting
the assessment process. The results were compared to the proposed
NASA Post 51-L baseline (5 May 1987) of 21 FMEAs and 15 CIL items
and the updated (7 December 1987) version of 21 FMEAs and 13 CIL
items. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was
provided through additional analysis as required. Upon completion
of the assessment, all of the IOA and NASA failure modes were in
agreement.
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Figure C.2d - _IN ENGINE ACTUATORASSESSMENT
C-9
C.3 Displays and Control Subsystem
The IOA product for D&C analysis consisted of 134 failure mode
worksheets that resulted in 8 PCIs being identified. In order
to facilitate comparison, 37 additional failure mode worksheets
were generated. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline of 4
January 1988, which consisted of 264 FMEAs and 21 CIL items.
The comparison determined if there were any results which had
been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This
comparison produced agreement on all but 45 FMEAs, which caused
no differences in the CIL items. Reference Figure C.3.
The issues arose due to different interpretation of NSTS 22206,
FMEA and CIL preparation instruction. IOA analyzed the electrical
circuit as a black box, and NASA analyzed the components of the
black boxes. Of the 45 differences with the FMEAs, all were minor
and did not affect criticalities assessment. In conclusion, IOA
is in full agreement with the revised NASA CIL baseline.
C.4 Guidance, Navigation and Control System
The IOA product for the GNC analysis consisted of 141 failure
mode worksheets that resulted in 24 PCIs being identified. In
order to facilitate comparison, 34 additional failure mode work-
sheets were generated. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline
(as of 4 January 1988) which consisted of 148 FMEAs and 36 CIL
items. The comparison determined if there were any results which
had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseiine. This
comparison produced agreement on all but 56 FMEAs, which caused
differences in zero (0) CIL items. Reference Figure C.4a & b.
The issues arose due to different interpretation of NSTS 22206,
FMEA and CIL preparation instructions. IOA analyzed the compo-
nents of the electrical circuits, generating 56 worksheets more
than NASA, who treated the electrical circuits as black boxes.
Of these 56 differences with the FMEAs, all were minor and did
not affect criticalities assessments. Three (3) of the FMEAs'
issues were with the SRB RGA's EPD&C. No drawings were available
to assess these FMEAs. In conclusion, IOA is in full agreement
with the revised NASA CIL baseline.
C.5 Orbiter Experiments
The IOA analysis of the OEX hardware initially generated 82
failure mode worksheets and identified 2 PCIs before starting
the assessment process (Fig. C.5). These analysis results were
compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 191 FMEAs
and 1 CIL item, which was generated using the older FMEA/CIL
instructions. Upon completion of the assessment, 167 of the 191
FMEAs were in agreement. Of the 24 that remained, 21 were IOA
3/3 FMEAs on components not addressed by NASA. Of the remaining
3, 2 issues were with FMEAs criticality level. The remaining
issue concerns a FMEA on a component which no longer exists, thus
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no FMEA is needed.
C.6 Auxiliary Power Unit
Comparison of the IOA APU analysis product with the NASA APU
FMEA/CIL baseline which emerged from the NASA FMEA/CIL review
process, produced numerous discrepancies. Discussions of these
discrepancies with the NASA Subsystem Manager resulted in the
identification of 28 issues, which were taken to the NASA/
Rockwell FMEA review working group meetings for consideration.
These reviews resulted in the addition of 4 new hardware FMEAs
to the APU FMEA baseline, 3 of which are CIL items.
Two (2) IOA issues remain for the APU subsystem at the completion
of the assessment (Fig. C.6). The first issue is a carryover
from the original 28 issues, and involves a fuel line temperature
sensor, which is not covered by the existing FMEA baseline. The
APU Sub- system Manager agreed that this sensor, the fuel pump
bypass line temperature sensor (MDAC ID 417X) should be covered
since loss of it could lead to curtailment of orbit activities
(if one other sensor is lost), but stated that consideration of
APU instrumentation FMEAs had been deferred indefinitely to allow
completion of the review of higher-criticality FMEAs. IOA
recommends adding a FMEA to cover failure of this sensor at
criticality 3/2R. IOA recommends a criticality of 3/IR for FMEA
04-2-518A-2 (lube oil heater thermostat failed closed), to
match the effect of possible loss of an APU due to lube oil over-
heating cited in APU electrical FMEAs 05-6N-2048-2, 05-6N-2050-2,
and 05-6N-2051-2. This discrepancy between hardware FMEAs and
electrical FMEAs did not emerge during the initial assessment of
the hardware FMEAs.
C.7 Backup Fliqht System
The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode
worksheets that resulted in 21 PCIs being identified. This product
was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline as of
October 1986, and subsequently compared with the applicable (as of
19 November 1987) Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power
Distribution and Control (EPD&C), and Displays and Controls NASA
CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results
which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline.
The original assessment determined there were numerous failure
modes and PCIs in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the
NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained 3
FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not
identified in the IOA product. The IOA prepared worksheets and
agreed with the NASA analysis for the 3 items. This increased
the IOA worksheets from 29 to 32 and the PCIs from 21 to 24 for
the original assessment as shown in Figure C.7.
NASA and Rockwell conducted several reviews and completed
C-15
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a substantial rewrite of all CILs between December 1986 and
November 1987. This effort included eliminating BFS as a
unique subsystem by integrating BFS CILs with primary DPS CILs.
The revised NASA baseline contained 4 more FMEAs for CIL items
that were not identified in the original IOA BFS product,
deleted the IMU CIL related FMEA mentioned in the previous
paragraph, and moved the ADTA and Air Data Probe CILs also
mentioned in the previous paragraph, to the GN&C subsystem.
Once again, the IOA prepared worksheets and agreed with the NASA
analysis of the additional failures. This increased the IOA
worksheets from 32 to 33 and the PCIs from 24 to 25 for the final
assessment. The IOA assessment of the final updated baseline (19
November 1987) results in agreement on all BFS CIL items, even
though there are differences in number of items and assigned
criticalities. Figure C.7 presents an overview of the assessment
results.
The differences in assigned criticalities are due to different
interpretation and application of the FMEA/CIL preparation
instructions contained in NSTS 22206. The IOA analyzed BFS hard-
ware failures with the assumption the BFS had been or would be
engaged. NASA analyzed BFS hardware failures as an integral part
of the DPS or EPD&C and, therefore, counted generic PASS failures
when assigning criticalities to BFS hardware failure modes. The
IOA interpretation neither added to, nor subtracted from the CIL.
C.8 Electrical Power Distribution and Control
The IOA product for the EPD&C analysis consisted of 1,671 failure
mode analysis worksheets that resulted in 468 PCIs being identi-
fied. Comparison was made to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline
(as of 31 December 1987), which consisted of 435 FMEAs and 158 CIL
items. Differences between the number of IOA worksheets and NASA
FMEAs resulted from different levels of analysis e.g., grouping
components into one FMEA versus a worksheet for each component),
failure modes not being identified within the original analysis,
and the fact that 2 different schematic sets were used (NASA used
Rockwell International assembly drawings and IOA used the
Rockwell International integrated schematics). Figure C.8
presents a comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline,
with the IOA recommended baseline.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
interpretation of the FMEA/CIL preparation instructions,
definitions of screen detectability, and some ignorance of flight
procedures on the part of IOA. After comparison, there were no
discrepancies found that were not already identified by NASA, and
the remaining issues are the result of the differences in the
schematics used by NASA and IOA.
C.9 Landinq/Deceleration Subsystem
The IOA analysis of the Landing/Deceleration hardware initially
C-18
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generated 246 failure mode worksheets and identified 124
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process (Fig. C.9). In the analysis report, the Landing/Deceleration
Subsystem was divided into six separate functional areas
according to hardware and function. Difficulty was encountered
in the hardware analysis due to the large amounts of proprietary
hardware, the tires and wheels, and many of the mechanisms of the
landing gear and the hydraulics systems. The initial NASA
Document, STS 82-0013, consisted of five separate functional
areas which included one hundred eighteen (118) FMEA/CIL's.
After the initial definition of the subsystem the thirty two (32)
NWS FMEAs were removed and separate group was initiated to
prepare the analysis for that subsystem. A decision was made to
include the EPD&C data for the subsystem and one hundred twenty
two (122) Electrical FMEAS were added to the subsystem, later
eight additional FMEAS were added to the EPD&C portion of the
subsystem. In November 1986 Forty four (44) Hydraulics FMEA's
were added to the subsystem. After the initial IOA Analysis was
completed in January 1987, a decision was made to remove the
pyrotechnic devices from the subsystem, which removed six FMEA's
from the NLG and MLG subsystems. At the time of this
report there are six subsystems that have been evaluated
including 267 NASA FMEA's and 120 CIL items, there 75 issues
between the NASA documentation and the IOA data.
The IOA analysis did not include fourteen of the NASA FMEAs due
to the lack of data to support the evaluation, and many of the
FMEAs were evaluated using documentation such as training manuals
and component procurement specification documents. The general
lack of documentation and the proprietary nature of the data were
major problems for the analysis.
The majority of the hardware issues were prepared on portions of
the subsystem where the NASA FMEAs would cover a whole assembly
with a limited number of FMEAs and the IOA analysis concluded
that a single NASA FMEA was covering several I/i failures that
were within the single FMEA. Several major components appeared
to be overlooked or considered to be a part of an assembly by the
NASA assessment. The IOA assessment also uncovered several
functional FMEAs that were discussed with the NASA subsystem
manager. Only the initial FMEA data on the hardware subsystems
was analyzed and the assessment reflects only the analysis of
that data.
The majority of the electrical (EPD&C) issues were prepared due
to operational discrepancies or evaluation differences on the
criticality of the function or hardware capability. This portion
of the document was completely analyzed and the assessment
includes the final resolution of the EPD&C data.
C.10 Purqe, Vent and Drain System
The IOA product for the PV&D independent analysis consisted of 62
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failure mode worksheets that resulted in 16 PCIs being
identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA
FMEA/CIL dated 20 November 1987, which consisted of 42 FMEAs and
8 CIL items. The difference in the number of IOA analysis
worksheets and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the different
levels of analysis detail performed to identify failure modes.
The comparison determined if there were any results found by the
IOA that were not included in the NASA FMEA/CIL.
The assessment produced agreement on all but 5 failure modes.
Three (3) failure modes for components were not identified by the
NASA FMEAs, 1 being a CIL item. Two (2) failure modes were
identified by IOA and NASA which have differences in criticality
resulting in 2 new CIL items. Figure C.10 presents a comparison of
the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with the IOA
recommended baseline and any issues. Detailed discussion of IOA
issues and recommendations are provided in subsequent paragraphs.
The assessment between the IOA Purge System worksheets and NASA
Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline produced 1 issue. IOA recommends the
addition of a FMEA to the NASA baseline for the failure mode,
check valve leakage, as identified in IOA worksheet 9009. The
criticality for this failure mode is 3/3.
The assessment between the IOA WCCS worksheets and NASA Post
51-L FMEA/CIL produced 3 issues. IOA recommends the addition of
a FMEA to the NASA baseline for the failure mode WCCS outer
cavity tubing clogging, as identified in IOA worksheet 9036. The
criticality for this failure mode is i/I and, therefore, requires
NASA to generate a CIL. After further review/analysis, IOA agreed
to a i/i criticality for NASA Baseline FMEA/CIL 01-5-332404-5,
WCCS desiccant filter outer cavity leakage. However, NASA Base-
line FMEA/CIL 01-5-332404-6 describes the same component, same
failure, and same results, but with different windows with the
same design as a criticality 3/3. IOA recommends combining the 2
NASA FMEAs with a criticality of i/I. IOA disagrees with NASA
Baseline FMEA 01-5-332406-5 designated criticality 3/3. IOA work-
sheet 9037 for the same failure mode, WCCS outer cavity tubing
leakage, identifies the criticality as I/i. NASA Baseline FMEA
01-5-332403-1 identifies the same failure mode for the tubing,
but for a different set of windows as a criticality I/i. After
further analysis, IOA determined that the windows are all of
the same design. Therefore, the criticality of I/i should be
consistent. IOA recommends the combination of NASA FMEA/CILs
01-5-332403-1 and 01-5-332406-5 with an identified criticality
of I/i as presented on NASA Baseline FMEA/CIL 01-5-3320403-1
and IOA worksheet 9037.
The assessment between the ET/ORB Purge Disconnect Network IOA
worksheets and NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline produced 1 issue.
IOA recommends the addition of a FMEA to the NASA baseline for
the failure mode, ET/ORB Purge Disconnect external leakage, as
identified in IOA worksheet 9060. The criticality for this fail-
ure mode is 3/3. IOA recognizes this as a credible failure mode.
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C.ll Pyrotechnics
The IOA analysis of the Pyrotechnics hardware initially generated
41 failure mode worksheets and identified 41 PCIs before starting
the assessment process (Fig. C.ll). No additional failure mode
analysis worksheets were generated to facilitate comparison.
These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post
51-L baseline of 37 FMEAs and 37 CIL items, which were generated
using the NSTS-22206 FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon completion of
the assessment, 27 of the 37 FMEAs were in agreement. Of the 13
that remained, 7 had minor discrepancies that did not affect
criticality. Of the remaining 6, 3 were the result of data entry
errors and involve the numerical criticality assignment. IOA
recommends upgrading the criticalities of 2 IOA FMEAs from 2/IR
to I/I and downgrading the criticality of 1 IOA FMEA from I/I to
2/IR. There are 4 IOA FMEAs for 2 components not analyzed by
NASA FMEAs. In summary, IOA recommends that the credible failure
modes of "Fail to Function" and "Inadvertent Operation" be
included for the respective pressure cartridges in the RMS
Guillotine Assembly and the Rendezvous Radar Release Mechanism.
C.12 Thermal Control System
C.12.1 Active Thermal Control System
The ATCS Assessment Overview figure C.12a lists the total number of
IOA and NASA FMEA and CIL items along with a comparison of the
discrepancies or issues identified during the assessment. For
analysis purposes, the ATCS was divided into 4 subsystems:
the Freon Coolant Loop (FCL), the Radiator Flow Control Assembly
(RFCA), the Flash Evaporator System (FES) and the Ammonia Boiler
System (ABS).
The IOA analysis of the ATCS hardware initially generated 310
failure mode worksheets and identified i01 PCIs before starting
the assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, 74
additional failure mode worksheets were generated. Additionally,
upon closer examination, IOA deemed i0 of the original failure
modes to be non-credible and recommends deleting them. Thus, the
final IOA analysis identified 374 FMEAs and 147 potential CILs.
The analysis results were compared to the available NASA FMEA/CIL
data. A total of 252 NASA FMEAs and 109 NASA CILs were identified.
The discrepancy between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be
explained by the different approaches used by NASA and IOA to
group failure modes. This resulted in multiple IOA FMEAs being
mapped to a single NASA FMEA. However, every NASA FMEA is mapped
to at least 1 IOA worksheet. A total of i01 FMEA and 30 CIL
issues were identified on the ATCS. A number of these issues
involved failures which were identified by IOA but not by NASA.
These included external leakage of heat exchanger fluid and exter-
nal leakage of water/steam from the FES ducts. These failures
plus the remaining issues should be examined by NASA and included
in the FMEA package as required.
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C.12.2 Life Support and Airlock Support System
The IOA product for the Lifesupport System (LSS) and Airlock
Support System (ALSSL) analysis consisted of 511 failure mode
worksheets that resulted in 140 PCIs. Comparison was made to
the NASA baseline dated 1 October 1987 which consisted of 456
FMEAs and i01 CIL items. After the assessment process, the
number of IOA analysis worksheets rose to 694, with 171 total
CIL items. The difference in the number of IOA analysis work-
sheets and the NASA FMEAs can be explained by the different
levels of analysis detail performed to identify failure modes.
Figure C.12b presents a comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA
data, with the IOA recommended baseline, and any issues.
In the Supply Water Subsystem (SWS), one major discrepancy noted
between the NASA FMEA approach and the IOA analysis was the use of
multiple failure scenarios in assigning the functional criticali-
ties. The IOA approach determined what the redundancies were for
the hardware item under study, and then assign the functional
criticality consistent with NSTS-22206. The NASA approach seemed
to define the redundancy to the effect after the item had failed.
Thus, IOA believes that the functional criticalities become so
broad that visibility into a particular hardware item will be lost.
For example, the NASA assessment of water system leaks relates to
loss of the Flash Evaporator System but is further related to loss
of this Total Active Thermal Control System (Radiators and Ammonia
Boilers) and classified a IR criticality. The IOA analysis con-
sidered the Flash Evaporator System may be deprived of water which
was considered a mission loss condition or a 2R criticality.
The radiators and the ABS are considered unassociated failures.
Another discrepancy was over the determination of functional
criticality for total loss of all redundancies in conjunction with
the failure mode under study. For example, on the fuel cell outlet
lines, the NASA FMEA treated the functional loss to receive fuel
cell water due to external leakage the same as the case for
restricted line flow. IOA agreed that restricted flow results in
"dead-heading" of the fuel cells, thus potentially a loss of life
or vehicle condition. However, external leakage was considered
only a mission impact for the functional loss.
The Waste Management Subsystem assessment centered on the
following 2 issues. First, a potential loss of the WCS was
viewed as a 3/2R criticality by IOA for any "off nominal"
condition. The condition of "off nominal" was defined as any
failure which could potentially require use of contingency waste
collection methods if another failure occurred. However,the NASA
FMEA listed these as non-mission essential failure criticalities.
Second, the IOA analysis viewed a Vacuum Vent Dump Line blockage
or loss of the heaters as a potential loss of life/vehicle
condition. A potentially hazardous atmosphere of hydrogen and
oxygen could occur in the vacuum vent line if it were blocked by
debris or ice.
In the Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression (SD/FS) subsystems,
C-27
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the major outcome of the analysis and assessment points up the
criticality of the Avionics Bay Fire Suppressant containers.
The concern of these single string circuits is during the ascent
and entry phrases when the crew has no opportunity to use the
portable extinguishers in the event the primary bottles fail to
discharge. Another consideration is the common power source for
the smoke detectors and the reset signal. Isolation of the 2
should increase the possibilities of bypassing a reset circuit
problem. The actual issues defined were related to screen
differences and suggest deleting i0 items as CILs while adding 2
items, and modifying i0 criticalities without affecting the CIL
count.
The following is a discussion of the Airlock Support System
(ALSS) assessment. The principle reason for assessment discre-
pancies between the NASA FMEA and the IOA analysis centered on
the consideration that the Airlock is not, and should not be, a
system classified as emergency hardware. It may be true that the
crew can use it for emergency EVAs, but this is part of the pro-
cedure that has been devised to solve an emergency in another
system. To compound that failure, that is, failing the airlock
along with the emergency failure, to increase the criticalities
is like assigning criticalities to procedures devised to solvethe
original emergency. With the same logic, the EMU suits will have
to be declared an emergency system which is also unacceptable
because this was not the original intent for either system,
Airlock or EMU.
C.13 Crew Equipment
The IOA analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware initially generated
352 failure mode worksheets and identified 78 PCIs before starting
the assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, 78
additional failure mode analysis worksheets were generated. These
analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L base-
line of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL items. The FMEAs that remained had
minor discrepancies that did not affect criticality.
An overview of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Figure C.13.
The more significant assessment results for each area within
the Crew Equipment Subsystem are addressed in the following
discussions:
C.13.1 EVA Equipment Assessment Results
The IOA analysis identified 5 failure modes of the EVA scissors.
NASA determined the EVA scissors were non-critical items, so
there were no FMEA/CILs available for comparison. The assessment
of the EMU light assembly generated 8 new failure modes. One (i)
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of these failure modes (MDAC ID i1216) shows the battery cell as
a criticality I/I because of the possibility of toxic venting or
explosion. Three (3) new FMEAs were generated for the OBS. The
IOA analysis of the OBS identified 5 failure modes which were not
considered by NASA. The failure modes were not critical, but were
included for completeness. The assessment of the PFR generated 1
new FMEA, which was not critical.
C.13.2 EVA Tethers Assessment Results
The IOA disagrees with NASA's analysis of a hook failing to close
as criticality I/i. The failure mode implies to an unrestrained
crewmember. The IOA differs with NASA on this issue for both the
ERCM safety tether and the waist tether. For all other failure
modes, MDAC eigher agrees with, or accepts NASA's analysis.
C.13.3 EVA Tools Assessment Results
The NASA analysis does not include a failure mode corresponding to
a failure of the 3-point latch hook. This failure mode should be
added to NASA's FMEA/CIL database. The IOA believes that NASA's
analysis of the snatch block hook latch as a criticality 2/IR is
too high and should be lowered. If the hook latch fails to close,
then the tool is not in use at that time. For the other EVA tools,
the IOA either agrees with or accepts NASA's results.
C.13.4 IVA Tools Assessment Results
The FMEA/CIL assessment recommends deleting 3 FMEAs as being non-
credible failures (MDAC IDs 4200, 4307, and 4310). With these
deletions, IOA agrees completely with NASA on the IVA tools that
were analyzed. All of the tools were found to be non-critical
primarily because of redundant hardware.
C.13.5 Food Assemblies Assessment Results
The IOA found that none of the hardware which had been analyzed
were critical hardware. IOA identified 35 FMEAs which were not
analyzed by NASA, and generated 44 new FMEAs to correspond to
failure modes NASA identified which had not been analyzed by IOA.
The slight differences in criticality ratings of FMEAs between IOA
and NASA are primarily due to differences in groundrules. During
the assessment process, it was determined that 5 IOA failure modes
were non-credible and IOA recommends that these be deleted.
C.13.6 Orbiter Hardware Assessment Results
The IOA found that none of the Orbiter hardware, which had been
analyzed, were critical hardware. The assessment did generate
2 new FMEAs for the treadmill and 6 new FMEAs for the COAS. The
C-31
assessment recommends accepting NASA's FMEAs and criticalities
for the mid-deck stowage lockers.
C.14 Instrumentation
The IOA analysis of the Instrumentation hardware initially
generated 88 failure mode worksheets and identified 8 PCIs before
starting the assessment process (Fig. C.14). These analysis
results were compared to a NASA baseline which was frozen as of 1
January 1988, with 14 Post 51-L FMEAs included in a total of 96
FMEAs and 18 CIL items, which were generated using the referenced
FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon completion of the assessment, 82
of the 107 FMEAs were in agreement. Of the 25 that remained, 4
are 2/2 criticality and not currently on the NASA CIL list and 7
new FMEAs were generated which had no NASA match. The remaining
14 FMEAs are of a different criticality than the NASA
interpretation. None of these 14 FMEAs affect the CIL listing.
C.15 Data Processinq System
The IOA analysis of the DPS hardware initially generated 85 fail-
ure mode worksheets and identified 2 PCIs before starting the
assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, 37 addi-
tional failure mode analysis worksheets were generated (See Fig.
C.15). These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA
Post 51-L baseline of 78 FMEAs and 25 CIL items, which was
generated using the Rockwell 100-2G FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon
completion of the assessment, 60 of the 78 FMEAs were in
agreement. Of the 18 that remained, 14 had minor discrepancies
that did not affect criticality. Of the remaining 4, 2 issues
were with FMEAs (05-5-B03-I-I and 05-5-B03-2-I) that had
considered failure modes outside the DPS subsystem, and caused
inflated criticalities. These criticalities mistakenly placed
both FMEAs on the CIL. The other 2 issues were with FMEAs (05-5-
B01-1-1 and 05-5-B02-I-I) that also considered failure modes
outside the DPS subsystem. However, when the correct failure
mode is included, the current criticalities will remain
unchanged. In summary, all issues may be attributed to
differences between ground rules in Rockwell 100-2G and NSTS
22206 instructions. The IOA recommends correcting the failure
modes considered in the 4 FMEAs, which lowers criticality
assignments in 2 of the FMEAs, and removes them from the CIL.
C.16 Atmosphere Revitalization Pressure Control System
The IOA analysis of the ARPCS hardware initially generated 266
failure mode worksheets and identified 89 PCIs before starting
the assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, 22
additional failure mode analysis worksheets were generated.
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These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post
51-L baseline of 262 FMEAs and 87 CIL items. Upon completion of
the assessment, of the 273 total IOA failure modes, 124 remained
as issues to be resolved. A summary of the FMEA/CIL counts for
IOA and NASA is provided in Figure C.16, and some of the
significant issues follow.
The FMEA considered the LEH panels as emergency systems; and, as
such, it was seen as potential for loss of life/ vehicle for any
failure which resulted in loss of LEH usage. IOA accepted this
assumption with some reservations. First, the LEH panels do not
fit into the strict definition of the emergency systems stated in
the NSTS-22206, Paragraph 2.l.e. This definition excludes
hardware (such as LEH panels) which performs a function used
during any nominal mission phase or during intact abort.
Second, there is no limitation as to how broad this definition
will be used throughout the ARPCS. That is, any failure of an
item upstream of the LEH panels which negates the use of the LEHs
is compounded by the assumption that an emergency condition
exists. This approach seems to be too conservative, which may
result in loss of visibility into an item when studied under
nominal conditions.
The FMEA studied "craced mounting flange: failure mode for the
cabin negative relief valve (FMEA 06-1-0203-3) and cabin positive
relief valve (FMEA 06-1-0201-3). The causes are listed as
material defect, mechanical shock, and vibration. IOA did not
study this failure mode, and considered the failure mode and
cause relationship not credible. The material defect is ruled
out based on the IOA general project groundrule (Appendix B.2.4),
otherwise this failure mode should be included for all hardware
items. The mechanical shock and vibration are not realistic
since their magnitude must be very high and far beyond the
structural integrity of the vehicle in order to cause such a
failure. Also, this condition presumes a failure already in
progress (vehicle undergoing severe and dangerous condition)
contrary to the NSTS-22206 hardware criticality groundrules.
FMEA studied "inability to restrict" as failure of the flow
restrictor. IOA considered this failure mode and cause
relationship not credible and it was, therefore, not studied.
There was no detailed FMEA information to further investigate
this failure mode.
FMEA studied "restricted flow" for lines and fittings. IOA
studied this failure mode for appropriate hardware items on the
line. This was done primarily because the causes of flow
restriction (contamination, corrosion) most likely will
restrict flow at the hardware items (valves, screens,. . . etc.)
before the line. Second, the restricted flow of an item
at a particular location on the line may yield different effects
and criticalities, and hence is easier to investigate.
IOA studied electrical solenoids and motors separately from their
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associated valves, and did not find any reference to them in the
FMEA data. However, a match of these items was made based on the
FMEA results for the valve. The electrical solenoids and motors
may be either covered separately or the failure modes and causes
assed for the valves should address them.
C.17 Hydraulic/Water Spray Boiler
The IOA product for the HYD/WSB analysis consisted of 447 failure
mode worksheets that resulted in 183 PCIs being identified.
Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as of 19 November 1986)
which consisted of 364 FMEAs and iii CIL items. The comparison
determined if there were any results which had been found by the
IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced
agreement on all but 68 FMEAs which caused differences in 23 CIL
items. Figure C.17 presents a comparison of the proposed Post 51-L
NASA baseline, with the IOA recommended baseline, and any issues.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA FMEA/
CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older groundrules
document which has since been superseded by the NSTS 22206 used by
the IOA. After comparison, there were no discrepancies found that
were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining issues may
be attributed to differences in groundrules.
C.18 Mechanical Actuation Subsystem
An overview of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline and any identified issues, is presented
in Figure C.18. In the analysis and assessment report, the MAS was
divided into nine sections according to hardware and function.
Each of these sections are identified, with summary assessment
results, in Figure C.18.
The IOA analysis of the MAS hardware initially generated 685
failure mode worksheets and identified 476 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to
facilitate comparison, 28 additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline (5 February, 1988) of 510
FMEAs and 252 CIL items using available NASA FMEA/CIL data. The
discrepancy between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be
explained by the different approach used by NASA and IOA to group
failure modes. In many cases, multiple IOA FMEAs were mapped to
a single NASA FMEA. The MAS assessment identified a total of 472
issues. Many of these issues resulted from failures identified
by IOA which could not be matched to available NASA FMEAs. It is
believed that other issues resulted from IOA use and
interpretation of NSTS-22206 differing slightly from criteria
used by RI and NASA, and a difference in criticality assignments
for a particular hardware item or function.
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C.19 Manned Maneuverinq Unit
The IOA analysis of the MMU hardware initially generated 136 fail-
ure mode worksheets and identified 69 PCIs before starting the
assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, 57
additional failure mode analysis worksheets were generated. These
analysis results were compared to the proposed Martin Marietta Post
51-L baseline of 179 FMEAs and ii0 CIL items. Upon completion of
the assessment, 121 of the 204 IOA failure modes remained as issues
to be resolved. A summary of the FMEA/CIL counts for IOA and NASA
is provided in Figure C.19, and some of the significant issues
follow.
The Martin Marietta analysis format lacked a comprehensive
definition of the flight phases, screens, and the item(s) under
study. All the flight phases were not always analyzed for prep,
ops, and post ops for each failure mode. The screens A and B
were not specifically designated per NSTS 22206. IOA had to
interpret their status based on very limited information
provided. Screen C was not addressed; and it was, therefore,
left blank throughout the assessment.
The Martin Marietta analysis did not address a specifichard-
ware item in some cases, but used an assembly instead. This made
it very difficult to investigate failure modes and effects of a
particular item and its impact on the overall system.
The MMU PREP and POST-OPS definitions were not too clear, and it
was consequently difficult to match their criticalities. IOA
considered every MMU activity to begin with PRE-OPS activities
and end with POST-OPS activities prior to the start of the next
MMU OPS. The Martin Marietta definition seems to suggest that
the PREP activities start with the first MMU PRE-OPS and stop
after the last MMU OPS activity. The period after the last
planned MMU OPS will then be POST-OPS.
There were a number of issues related to the treatment of the
multi-position switches. Martin Marietta used a more broad and
general failure mode approach, such as open or closed. IOA
considered and investigated the failure of single contact
positions for open and closed and assigned the worst case
criticality. Multi-position switches to fail open or closed
were, in general, considered to be unreasonable.
Electrical items, such as diodes, resistors, relays, etc.
associated with an LRU circuit were not studied by Martin
Marietta. IOA provided analysis for these items to be
incorporated into the final FMEA/CIL study.
C.20 Nose Wheel Steerinq Subsystem
The IOA analysis of the NWS hardware initially generated 78
failure mode worksheets and identified 42 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs). As a result of the assessment process, 15 NWS
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failure mode worksheets were deleted and an additional 5 analysis
worksheets were generated and added to the assessment package.
The assessment comparison also gave rise to 14 issues between the
IOA NWS analysis and the corresponding NASA FMEAs (Fig. C.20).
Of these issues, 9 are the result of failure modes generated by
the IOA that did not have corresponding NASA FMEAs. The
remainder of the issues are the result of differences in the NWS
subsystem failure mode assigned hardware/functional
criticalities.
The most significant Orbiter assessment issue was uncovered
during the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) subsystem analysis. The
failure mode was a "stuck" autopilot pushbutton causing the worst
case effect of loss of crew/vehicle (criticality i/i). The
Orbiter autopilot is used for entry, and manually disengaged
before landing. The autopilot is engaged by "Roll/Yaw Auto" and
"Pitch Auto" pushbutton indicators (PBIs). If either "Auto" PBI
fails closed, the autopilot cannot be permanently disengaged.
With the autopilot remaining engaged, the Orbiter will attempt to
"Autoland", which requires a Microwave Landing System (MLS) on
the ground. MLS is not required for day landings, and has not
been "available" for four of the last seven STS missions.
Without the MLS, use of the autoland alone will cause the Orbiter
to miss the runway. A single point failure with no redundancy
and which threatens loss of crew/vehicle is categorized by NSTS
22206 as a "criticality i" item. Rockwell is adding the failure
mode to the FMEA/CIL baseline and developing a software change to
bypass a failed "Auto" switch.
Some of the criticality issues cannot be resolved without
performing additional analysis or testing of the NWS system.
Other issues can be more easily resolved by establishing official
flight rules or crew procedures for certain failure modes. In
either case, IOA has recommended upgrading the existing
criticalities of the affected NWS components until conclusive
test/analysis results or written flight rules/crew procedures are
available to support downgrading the criticalities.
The IOA assessment of the existing CILs gave rise to 9 issues.
Of these issues, 8 are the result of IOA identifying additional
Potential Critical Items. One PCI concerns the generation of
independent FMEA/CILS for like critical hardware as recommended
by NSTS 22206. A second PCI is the result of an IOA recommended
criticality upgrade. The remainder of the 8 PCIs concern
hardware or failure modes excluded by the NASA analysis. IOA
also recommends the deletion of one NASA CIL.
C.21 Remote Manipulator System
The overview (Fig. C.21a) presents the results of the RMS hardware
assessment and the final results. Each component is identified
along with the number of FMEAs, CILs, and issues for each. There
are 69 issues which remain open. These issues occurred in the
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MCIU, Arm Based Electronics, and the Mechanical Arm.
The final results of the RMS assessment are that 154 issues were
identified. Eighty-five (85) of these issues were resolved with
the NASA Subsystem Manager. Of these 85 issues, 64 were resolved
without change to the baseline. Twenty-one (21) failures were
combined, resulting in 3 new FMEAs and 3 new CIL items. The 15
remaining IOA failure modes were added as additional causes to
existing FMEAs. The 69 IOA RMS issues that remain open concern
the difference in criticalities due to software routines being
classified as unlike redundancy. IOA feels that they should not
be used to lower the criticalities of the affected FMEAs.
The IOA analysis of the EPD&C/RMS hardware (Fig. C.21b) initially
generated three hundred and forty-five (345) failure mode
worksheets and identified one hundred and seventeen (117)
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed
NASA Post 51-L baseline of one hundred and thirty-two (132) FMEAs
and sixty-six (66) CIL items, which were generated using the
NSTS-22206 FMEA/CIL instructions. IOA generated failure mode
analysis worksheets for both port and starboard Remote
Manipulator Systems whereas the NASA generated FMEAs for only one
system (did not specify which). The IOA analysis was performed
on a component level for components assigned reference designator
numbers on the drawings with one component per worksheet. The
NASA analysis was performed with like multiple similar components
on one FMEA. In some cases the NASA FMEAs were generated for an
entire circuit without necessarily specifying the components
included in the circuit by any identification number, thus direct
comparisons of the IOA and NASA analyses were not meaningful in
the sense of numbers of failures and identification of
criticalities that have any uniformity. Efforts to compare the
two analyses required consolidation of components in all but a
few cases where the items were single point failure items as some
of the switches were found to be. Twenty-eight (28) additional
IOA failure mode analysis worksheets were generated to facilitate
comparison. Upon completion of the assessment, five (5) issue
items were identified that involved critical items where IOA
recommends that NASA FMEAs generated for that failure mode of the
component or where the NASA Criticality for that failure mode of
that component be upgraded. There were also six (6) issues
identified where IOA recommends upgrading of the NASA assigned
criticality but these are not critical items list candidates.
C.22 Atmospheric Revitalization System
The ARS Assessment Overview figure C.22 lists the total number of
IOA and NASA FMEA and CIL items, along with a comparison of the
discrepancies or issues identified during the assessment. For
analysis purposes, the ARS was divided into 6 subsystems: the
Pump Package, the Avionics/Water Loop, the Heat Exchanger, the
Avionics/Air Loop, the IMU/Air Loop and the Cabin/Air Loop.
The IOA analysis of the ARS hardware initially generated 245
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IOA NASA ISSUES
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failure mode worksheets and identified 84 PCIs prior to starting
the assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, 74
additional failure mode worksheets were generated and 8 of the
original worksheets were deleted. Thus, the final IOA analysis
identified 311 FMEAs and 84 potential CILs. The analysis results
were compared to the available NASA FMEA/CIL data. A total of
223 NASA FMEAs and 84 NASA CILs were identified. The discrepancy
between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the
different approaches used by NASA and IOA to group failure modes.
This resulted in multiple IOA FMEAs being mapped to a single NASA
FMEA. However, every NASA FMEA is mapped to at least 1 IOA work-
sheet.
A total of 102 FMEA and 36 CIL issues was identified on the ARS.
A number of these issues involved failures which were identified
by IOA but not by NASA. These issues resulted mainly from
insufficient data obtained from NASA.
C.23 Extravehicular Mobility Unit
The IOA analysis of the EMU hardware initially generated 497
failure mode worksheets and identified 390 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to
facilitate comparison, additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline (the most recent
available as of December 31, 1987) (Fig. C.23). The discrepancy
between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the
different approach used by NASA and IOA to identify failure modes
or simply by errors of omission 53 failure modes were identified
by the IOA analysis that were not covered by the NASA FMEAs;
Forty two were considered issues due to CIL impacts.
With regard to the issues, the IOA has identified a total of one
hundred and fifty-three (153). Ninety of these are concentrated
in the PLSS and the DCM. This was not unexpected due to each
subsystem's complexity and significant use of redundancy. These
features resulted in different levels of analysis and in
different determinations of redundancy by both the IOA and the
NASA. Another area of PLSS and CM issues resulted from differing
usage of screen B detectability requirements. The NASA
established an interpretation that so long as the crewmember
could obtain safe haven upon detection the screen would be
passed; however, the IOA disagreed with the use of an emergency
system (the SOP) to support obtaining safe haven.
The largest remaining block of issues (40) are distributed
throughout the HUT, helmet, air assemblies, gloves, and the LTA.
Although many of these issues are similar in cause to those of
the PLSS and the DCM (namely different levels of analysis or
different interpretation of redundancy), a large group of these
resulted from a common failure mode - loss of pressure integrity.
The NASA would "qualify" the failure mode as loss of pressure
C-48
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maintenance capability in excess of SOP make-up capability. The
IOA's concern was that it automatically assumed loss of the SOP
in assigning a I/i criticality; the IOA would prefer a 2/IR with
a failure of screen B and screen C to reflect the failure
scenario.
The IOA also notes that the SOP has been determined to be an
emergency subsystem to the EMU. The IOA recommended the SOP to
be just that in the IOA analysis report issued in 1986.
C.24 Power Reactant Storaqe and Distribution System
The IOA analysis of the EPG/PRSD hardware initially generated
162 failure mode worksheets and identified 82 PCIs before
starting the assessment process. In order to facilitate compari-
son, 4 additional failure mode analysis worksheets were generated.
These analysis results (Fig. C.24a) were first compared to the
proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 92 FMEAs and 58 CIL items,
and then to the updated version of 66 FMEAs and 39 CIL items,
and finally to the 3 baseline configuration of 64 FMEAs and 39
CIL items for the 2 tank baseline, and 67 FMEAs and 42 CIL items
for the 3 and 4 tank baselines. The discrepancy between the
number of IOA and NASA FMEAs can be explained as follows.
Eight (8) issues arose from inner tank component FMEAs that had
not been covered by NASA, but which may have been covered by
the tank manufacturer, Beech Aircraft.
Two (2) issues were due to FMEAs the NASA Subsystem Manager
thought should be covered under the ground operations FMEAs.
Thirteen (13) issues were caused by the differences between the
Rockwell International reliability desk instructions No. 100-2G
and the NSTS 22206.
Four (4) issues can be explained by the different approachs used
by NASA and IOA to group failure modes.
Upon completion of the assessment, and after discussions with
the NASA Subsystem Manager, 19 of the 77 recommended FMEAs were in
agreement. Of the 58 that remained, 27 had minor discrepancies
that did not affect criticality.
The IOA analysis of the EPD&C/EPG hardware initially generated
263 failure mode worksheets and identified 60 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to
facilitate comparison, 42 additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 211 FMEAs and 47 CIL
items, which was generated using the NSTS 22206 FMEA/CIL
instructions (Fig. C.24b). Upon completion of the assessment,
all of the 211 FMEAs were in agreement. The difference in the
the total number of FMEAs between IOA and NASA is due to the
analysis level used to assign the failure modes.
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C.25 Main Propulsion System
The IOA MPS analysis generated 690 FMEA worksheets, 371 of
which were PCIs. Of the total, 438 FMEAs were generated for
mechanical components and 252 for electrical components (Fig.
c.25).
General differences of opinion and interpretation between the
IOA MPS Group and the RI/NASA MPS team resulted in different
criticality assignments. The RI/NASA team, for example, tended
to have a broader view of an item's function than did IOA.
A related difficulty was the matter of redundancy. Again, the
RI/ NASA team adopted a broader view of redundancy than did IOA.
RI/NASA viewed sequential main engine failures as loss of
redundancy. IOA believes engines are not redundant to each
other because, while they perform identical functions, they do
not perform the same function.
Another area of differing opinions was the RI/NASA practice of
introducing criticality i/I failures, such as line breaks or
leaks, as a second failure, thereby creating a 2/IR criticality
regardless of the first failure. IOA concludes that, in most
cases, this is not consistent with the NSTS 22206 methodology or
definitions.
C.26 Orbital Maneuvering System
The IOA product for the EPD&C analysis consisted of 284 hard-
ware and 667 EPD&C failure mode worksheets that resulted in
160 hardware and 216 EPD&C PCIs being identified. A comparison
was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline as of
23 December 1987, which consisted of i01 hardware and 142 EPD&C
FMEAs, and 68 hardware and 49 EPD&C CIL items. In order to
facilitate comparison, additional IOA analysis worksheets were
generated as required. IOA mapped 138 hardware and 147 EPD&C
FMEAs, and 93 hardware and 47 EPD&C CILs and PCIs into the NASA
FMEAs and CILs (Fig. C.26a&b). The IOA and NASA FMEA/CIL
baselines were com- pared and discussions were held with the NASA
Subsystem Managers in an effort to resolve the identified issues.
A majority of the initial hardware issues was resolved; however,
47 hardware issues, 29 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, 70
EPD&C issues, 31 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain
unresolved.
Many of the unresolved EPD&C issues result because of differences
in interpretation of NSTS 22206. The NASA/RI definition of redun-
dancy allowed the selection of specific unrelated failures which
were required to cause known problems; e.g., failures required
to cause continuous power to a valve. The IOA redundancy string
included only items that were capable of performing the specific
function of the item being analyzed. IOA considers many NASA/RI
redundancy strings to include multiple unrelated failures.
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A number of the unresolved hardware and EPD&C issues involve
failure modes identified by IOA which are not currently addressed
on the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. IOA considers each of these
failure modes to be credible, and recommends that they be added.
The remaining unresolved OMS hardware and EPD&C issues result
because of differences between the IOA and NASA/RI analyses of
the OMS subsystem, which resulted in criticality, redundancy
screen, or failure effect differences.
C.27 Reaction Control System
The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware
and 2,064 EPD&C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141
hardware and 449 EPD&C PCIs being identified. A comparison was
made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline as of 23
December 1987, which consisted of 99 hardware and 524 EPD&C FMEAs
and 62 hardware and 144 EPD&C CIL items. In order to facilitate
comparison, additional IOA analysis worksheets were generated as
required. IOA mapped 166 hardware and 597 EPD&C FMEAs, and 133
hardware and 116 EPD&C CILs and PCIs into the NASA FMEAs and
CILs (Fig. C.27a&b). After comparison of the IOA baseline to
the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline and discussions with the NASA
Subsystem Manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL
items or PCIs, and 280 EPD&C issues, 158 of which concern CIL
items or PCIs, remain unresolved. These categories: NSTS 22206
interpretation differences, IOA failure modes not currently
addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL, and RCS subsystem analysis
differences.
One hundred seven (107) of the unresolved EPD&C issues result
because of differences in interpretation of NSTS 22206. The
NASA/RI definition of redundancy allowed the selection of specific
unrelated failures which were required to cause known problems;
e.g., failures required to cause continuous power to a valve. The
IOA redundancy string included only items that were also capable
of performing the specific function of the item being analyzed.
IOA considers many NASA/RI redundancy strings to include multiple
unrelated failures, thus making criticalities too severe or
masking other critical failures found by IOA.
One hundred twenty-eight (128) of the unresolved hardware and
EPD&C issues involve failure modes identified by IOA which are not
currently addressed on the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. IOA considers
each of these failure modes to be credible, and recommends that
they be added.
The remaining unresolved RCS issues result because of differences
between the IOA and NASA/RI analyses of the RCS subsystem. Many
of these issues are linked to a few general differences in the
analyses performed by IOA and NASA/RI. For example, 17 of the
FRCS hardware issues are linked to the fact that IOA considered
the inability to deplete (dump) FRCS propellant to be critical
for entry. NASA/RI considered it critical only for ET
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separation. Six (6) of the ARCShardware issues result because
IOA considered any failure which resulted in the loss of primary
thrusters to be a Crit 1 during RTLS and TAL aborts due to the
resulting reduced OMSand RCS propellant dump rates. Several of
the RCS hardware issues are related to failures which result in
propellant leakage. Per NSTS 22206, IOA considered a_D_y leakage
of propellant to be critical, regardless of where it occurred.
NASA/RI did not apply this philosophy to all propellant leakage
failures. Fifty (50) of the unresolved EPD&C issues result
because IOA considered the inability to determine the actual
position of a valve to be a 3/2R. Loss of all redundancy could
lead to falsely failing the valve closed, thus affecting mission
operations. NASA/RI classified such failures as 3/3's. The
remainder of the unresolved analysis-difference issues exist
independently and cannot, for the most part, be linked to any
general differences.
C.28 Communication and Trackinq
The IOA analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware and
functions resulted initially in generation of 1,039 failure mode
and effects analysis (FMEA) worksheets with 269 being assigned as
Potential Critical Items (PCIs). An IOA and NASA assessment was
made by comparing 697 NASA FMEA worksheets and 239 Critical
Items. Discrepancies between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs
and CILs prevented a one to one comparison which required
generation of additional FMEA worksheets to facilitate collation.
The final IOA count equaled 1,108 FMEAs with 298 PCIs (Fig.
C.28).
Discrepancies noted between the IOA and NASA FMEA and PCI counts
were attributed to the following factors: different failure
modes employed by IOA and NASA, different definition of
electronic unit and function configurations and component levels,
based criticality assignments on a certain element of
subjectivity and interpretation of the NSTS 22206 instructions,
there were omissions, levels of unlike redundancy were different,
determinations as to the extent of units function or effects on
system level f unction were different and contract revision
requiring early submittal missed revised and new FMEA/CILs.
Many of the FMEA and PCI analysis differences and issues could
no doubt have been resolved through discussions with Subsystem
Managers had the contract not been prematurely cancelled. Also
many NASA FMEA worksheets were upgraded after the January i, 1988
freeze so that much of the assessment was made on initial
baseline FMEA's that did not reflect the latest thinking. The
most prominent number of PCIs pertained to loss of output and
loss of all capability to: obtain State Vector Updates, monitor
movement of the RMS, verify payload bay door closure through
observation that payload bay door latches did indeed latch,
perform Ku-band antenna boom stow and verification, maintain
mission support and obtain NAVAIDS data during night time abort
landings at unequiped emergency landing sites.
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APPENDIX D
Comparison of IOA Findings To Rockwell CIL Packages
A comparison of IOA recommended CIL items and Rockwell CIL
Packages is presented in Table D-I. The Rockwell CIL count
corresponds to 1 March 1988. Individual IOA subsystem CIL counts
are those that existed at each subsystem assessment completion,
which occurred from March 1987 through January 1988.
Consequently, this comparison should be used only as general
information.
No comparison is available for FMEAs because the Rockwell review
packages do not contain this information for all non-CIL items.
A general comparison of FMEA results is available in Table 1-1
(page 3), where the IOA suggested failure modes are compared to
the NASA baseline. The results shown in the following Table D-1
do not always resemble those previously presented in Table 1-2.
The numbers do not agree in all cases because the Rockwell
packages do not include GFE such as the RMS, EMU, MMU and OEX.
In addition, some differences may arise because the IOA baseline
was frozen on 1 January 1988, while some of the Rockwell reviews
were still in progress and the numbers fluid. The number of
issues varied in time in some cases as IOA findings were accepted
by Rockwell or NASA and incorporated into the program baseline.
This is documented in Table 1-2, page 4.
D-I
TABLE D-1
IOA TO ROCKWELL CIL PACKAGE COMPARISON (INTERIM)
SUBSYSTEM
Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP)
Hydraulic Actuators (HA)
Displays and Control (D&C)
Rockwell
CIL Package
ID
55
14,15
179,80
IOA*
24
59
21
CIL
Rockwell**
22
56
22
Issues
2
3
1
Guidance, Navigation & Control (GN&C)
Orbiter Experiments (OEX)
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
Backup Flight System (BFS)/DPS
Electrical Power, Distribution & Control (EPD&C)
Landing & Deceleration (L&D)
Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D)
Pyrotechnics (PYRO)
Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) and Life
Support System (LSS)
Crew Equipment (CE)
Instrumentation (INST)
Data Processi ng System (DPS) - Incl uded in 8 FS
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control
System (ARPCS)
Hydraulics & Water Spray Boiler (HYD & WS8)
Mechanical Actuation System (MAS)
Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
Nose Wheel Steering (NWS)
Remote Manipulator System (RMS)
Atmospheric Revitalization System (ARS)
Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
Power Reactant Supply & Distribution System
(PRS&D)
Main Propulsion System (MPS)
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
Reaction Control System (RCS)
Comm and Tracking (C&T)
Not in IOA Scope
Totals
61,62
N/A
59,60
83,84
85
5,6,7,8,12,13
2
108-112
91-96,99-101
102,103
81,82
89,90
41,42,97,98
3,4,16,18-30
NIA
36
(1)
106
48
158
124
15
41
318
80
22
73
183
512
(95)
9-11 41
N/A (448)
86-88 84
34
106
38
158
121
8
42
122
6
15
28
2
0
10
0
3
7
1
196
74
7
45
111 72
246 266
3O
19
NIA (547)
56,105,106
43-50
53,54
51,52
65-75,77,78
79
714
1,17,32-40,
57,58,76,104,
107
85
692
111
212
98
2382
140
249
281
3408
11
65
22
29
37
183
1042
*Asof 1 January 1988
**Asof 1 March 1988
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